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## THE UN, CSCE, NATO AND WEU PEACEKEEPING COOPERATION

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Conferência proferida pelo autor por ocasião da X Conferência Anual sobre Estudos Estratégicos, organizada pela Missão dos EUA junto da NATO, subordinada ao tema genérico «NATO IN THE 1990's: MOVING FROM THEORY TO ACTION» e que teve lugar em Knokke-Heist, na Bélgica, no período de 15 a 18 de Setembro de 1994.

No capítulo intitulado «ACTIVIDADES PROMOVIDAS PELO IDN», da presente revista, são dados mais pormenores sobre a Conferência aqui referida.

*John O. B. Sewall*

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1. *Introduction:* «Peacekeeping cooperation» among the UN, CSCE, NATO and WEU is too broad an area of analysis to cover in a brief paper without imposing some form of analytical framework and definitional clarity that can hopefully delimit the subject. With that in mind, I would first like to use the more inclusive term «peace operations» which include traditional peacekeeping at the low end; peace operations that involve other civil-military activities such as monitoring elections, cantonment of equipment, delivery of humanitarian assistance and rebuilding civil institutions, in the middle; and peace-enforcement at the high end. Secondly, we need to know a bit about the security structures themselves and how the peace operation pie is divided — in other words, who does what to whom. Then to the heart of the analysis, I will address what it is that these security structures should be cooperating about, and finally, with whom and how this cooperation is being handled.

My thesis, in brief, is that the rhetoric is there, but the reality is not. A good analogy is any national defense budget where the declared defense program and anticipated capabilities are never quite matched by reality, due to subsequent budget reductions or perhaps initial under-funding — witness the United States' strategy of being able to execute two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. The promises quite frequently become illusory and stretch off into the distant future. The Ministerial Communiqués and institutional descriptions similarly suggest a degree of cooperation in the peace operations which unfortunately does not exist as yet. The reasons are many, but in brief I would highlight:

- a lingering lack of clarity as to the appropriate substance of cooperation,

- weaknesses in institutional structure, particularly with regard to the CSCE and WEU,
- unhelpful competition among some institutional structures for a piece of the pie, e.g., NATO and WEU, and
- a lingering lack of consensus on roles and overall architecture.

Consequently, cooperation at the strategic and political-military level remains fragmentary and weak, with perhaps the weakest links being between NATO and the UN and NATO and the CSCE. Conversely, cooperation at the operational and tactical levels — military to military — is reasonably sound and improving. I speak here of NATO and the UN and NATO and the WEU.

2. *Who does what to whom?* This section of the paper does not purport to be exhaustive in detail — there are many studies on the subject — but it will attempt to provide some headlines and shorthand to get us in the game.

a. *United Nations (UN)*: The UN is the *world* organization with a charter covering peace operations, although «peacekeeping» as a term will not be found in the UN Charter itself. Nonetheless, the UN Charter and more recently Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali's report, *An Agenda for Peace*, describe various measures appropriate for the «Pacific Settlement of Disputes» (Chapter VI in the UN Charter), comprising preventive diplomacy, preventive deployments, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. The lore of knowledge and experience relating to traditional peacekeeping is well known, as is the contribution of certain nations in terms of participation in UN peacekeeping operations and related national training establishments. I note in particular the Nordic countries and Canada, although I could add specific Asian and African countries as well.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter relates to «Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.» This is the chapter which authorizes taking «action — as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security» — that is, intervention using coercive military force to achieve political objectives. UN Chapter VII operations may be either UN-authorized through a United Nations Security

Council Resolution, examples being Korea and the Persian Gul War, or UN-directed («blue beret») as recently seen in UNOSOM II.

The principal UN mechanisms relating to peace operations are:

- the Security Council which develops the mandate or authorizing UN Security Council Resolution;
- the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which provides military advice to the Secretary-General and the Security Council and doctrine and training guidance to nations. DPKO also plans and conducts peace operations on behalf of the Security Council;
- the Military Staff Committee, currently moribund, which potentially *could* provide military advice to the Security Council and strategic direction for UN peace operations;
- national troop contributions which comprise the land, sea and air units executing the mandate.

A brief assessment of the UN with regard to peace operations would suggest that it, first, suffers from overreach, the result of an explosion in peace operation commitments, now comprising 18 field operations with some 70+ thousand troops in the field and costing in the order of \$3.5 billion a year, second, it is in the process of improving its planning capability, field management and logistic support, but is not there yet; third, it has not stood up to the plate in providing appropriate doctrinal guidance nor resolving the conceptual problem of UN-directed «peace-enforcement» operations in conditions of near-anarchy, yet short of total war; and fourth, its record thus far in an operational context is that it is adequately structured to manage UN-directed peace-keeping operations, but not for UN-directed peace enforcement.

b. *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):*

The CSCE, involving 53 states, is a political consultative process, a *forum*, not at present an international organization with treaty status.

Nonetheless, following the 1990 CSCE Paris Summit, institutionalization of the «process» began and more recently the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration reflected agreement on developing a structure for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. In addition, the 1992 Helsinki

Declaration recognized the NATO offer of peacekeeping support included in the 1992 Oslo North Atlantic Council (NAC) Communiqué. Subsequently at the 1994 Alliance Summit in Brussels NATO committed itself to supporting «the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management».

CSCE mechanisms most involved with peace operations include:

- the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), which reviews current issues, prepares the work for and carries out the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
- the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna,
- the Permanent Committee, the first permanent body for political consultation and decision-making, and
- official fact-finding, monitoring and sanctions assistance missions.

A brief assessment of the CSCE with regard to peace operations would suggest that first, it still suffers from lack of structure, i.e., institutionalization; second, although considered a legitimate regional organization as described in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it is best suited for Chapter VI pacific settlement of disputes through fact finding, conflict prevention and limited peacekeeping; and third, with no forces and little structure, it is ill suited for crisis management or peace-enforcement missions.

*c. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):* NATO expanded its mission into peace operations in 1992 when it announced first at the Oslo NAC its readiness to support «on a case by case basis in accordance with... (its) own procedures» peace operations under the CSCE, and then at the December Brussels NAC its readiness to support peace operations under the UN. Although individual NATO nations have been consistent contributors to UN observer missions and UN unit deployments, as in UNPROFOR in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Somalia, NATO as an institution with its integrated military command first became involved in UN peace operations in 1992. *Operation Deny Flight*, the «no-fly zone» enforcement mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Operation Sharp Guard*, the Adriatic maritime embargo mission, and potential ground operations in Bosnia should a peace agreement be reached, are examples of NATO forces

operating under the operational control of a regional Major Subordinate Command (MSC) — AFSOUTH — in support of a UN-directed peace operation. In addition, NATO resources in the form of a mobile headquarters from Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) were provided to the UN Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) of UNPROFOR.

NATO's mechanisms relating to peace operations include:

- the North Atlantic Council (NAC), made up of NATO's 16 nations, the highest decision-making body in the Alliance;
- the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 38 nations, with its Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping;
- the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, currently with 22 signed partners, with its training and mission focus on peacekeeping, search and rescue and disaster relief;
- NATO's integrated military command structure; and
- the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative, designed to provide a command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) headquarters for NATO out-of-area operations, NATO and non-NATO peace operation coalitions, and Western European Union (WEU) led operations with NATO resources.

A brief assessment of NATO's capability in peace operations would suggest that first, with the New Strategic Concept's focus on conflict prevention and crisis management, it is ideally suited for peace operations as a mission; second, with its integrated military command and interoperable forces, it is well suited for both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement; third, with regard to command and control, it is well situated at the operational and tactical levels, but weak at the linkage between the operational and strategic levels where multinational forces, to include non-NATO, are involved, and weak at the strategic level between NATO and the UN and NATO and the CSCE.

d. *Western European Union (WEU)*: The WEU, currently nine member states with one potential member (Greece) pending ratification three associate members, two observers, and nine associate partners, is the most visible evidence of the concept known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The WEU has gained momentum in recent years and is in

the process of becoming the *de facto* defense arm of, and the eventual implementer of a common defense policy for, the European Union (EU). The WEU has had maritime peace-enforcement experience in the Persian Gulf War and currently participates in *Operation Sharp Guard* in the Adriatic under AFSOUTH's operational control as well as conducting embargo operations along the Danube River. Peace operations are a legitimate mission flowing from the Maastricht Treaty and accompanying Declaration (December 1991) which stated: «The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance... WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance».

Peacekeeping has been more specifically mandated in the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992.

WEU mechanisms associated with peace operations include:

- a modest Planning Staff (some 30-40 personnel);
- Associate Partners (9);
- although no in-being forces nor collective defense assets, on-call relationships with member states and the EuroCorps.

A brief assessment of WEU's capability for peace operations is that first, it is still suffering from a lack of institutional maturity, specifically in planning and managing operations; second, it is best suited for disaster relief, crisis management and limited peace-enforcement; third, it must depend on NATO for infrastructure support and a C<sup>2</sup> mechanism — the CJTF headquarters; and fourth, the absence of strategic C<sup>3</sup>I and a political-military planning body impedes effective command and control at the strategic level.

A matrix showing current membership in CSCE, NACC, PFP, NATO and WEU is at enclosure.

3. *Peace operation cooperation: About what?* In that peace operations constitute some of the more difficult military operations forces are called upon to execute, cooperation presumes a common conceptual underpinning and a high degree of coordination if cooperation is to be meaningful and contribute to the achievement of commonly agreed military and political objectives. In other words, cooperation implies a lot more than exhortation in communiqués and occasional exercises. Cooperation becomes easy once

the hard conceptual thinking and coordination have been achieved. My judgment is that we still have a long way to go in the pick and shovel area.

So what is the substantive menu? Although not all-inclusive, I would submit the following issues as start points if the Alliance is serious about cooperation and coordination with other security structures on peace operations.

- *Development of the mandate:* The development of the mandate or mission is the start point from which everything else flows. Both civilian and military leadership have an interest in ensuring that political objectives are clearly understood and mutually agreed, and that achievable military objectives can then be derived with as complete an analysis as is possible of resource requirements and those conditions defining success. The mission is also the start point for civilian agency participation such as Non-Governmental Organizations/Private Voluntary Organizations (NGOs/PVOs), civil-military coordination required and the appropriate military doctrine applicable to the conduct of military operations.

- *Associated military doctrine:* Doctrine, or the concept of how military forces go about accomplishing a specific mission, will be derived from the mandate itself, and doctrine in turn will determine what military forces do and have—that is, organization, equipment, training, exercises and rules of engagement. A lot of international (UN,NATO) and national work is being done on doctrine related to the entire spectrum of peace operations, but doctrine remains the critical area where central focus is needed, and I speak here of the UN, and where the premium for coordination and cooperation is extremely high.

- *Division of labor:* With the mandate and accompanying military doctrine mutually agreed, a division of labor can then be addressed. It is a division of labor first derived functionally in terms of conflict prevention, (e.g., FYR of Macedonia), or crisis management, (e.g., Bosnia), or a combination of both. If crisis management, is it traditional peacekeeping (e.g., Cyprus), or peace-enforcement (e.g., Somalia), and is there a range of civil-military activities (NGOs, PVOs) involved (Cambodia, Somalia)? Secondly, the mission or mandate involves a division of labor among security structures



and among nations within those security structures. The UN and CSCE provide observers, fact finders and monitors (conflict prevention); the UN, CSCE (potentially), NATO and the WEU execute preventive deployments and peacekeeping (conflict prevention/crisis management); and the UN and CSCE (by authorization) and NATO and the WEU (by execution) execute peace-enforcement. Division of labor by function, security structure and geographical focus is an important substantive issue requiring cooperation. Thus far the international community has seemed to have operated more on the axiom of «the more the merrier» with the military left to work it out on the ground, than on disciplined analysis and logic.

- *Command and Control (C<sup>2</sup>)*: Command and control, not in the narrow sense of communications hardware, but in the broader sense of ensuring a coordinated multinational effort to achieve political and related military objectives, must focus on four critical questions relating to the mandate:

- To what ends?
- Commanded by whom?
- With what forces?
- By what means?

Any multinational peace operation inevitably experiences the inherent tension between national sovereignty and the military principle of unity of command. In both UN-directed and UN-authorized peace operations where different security structures are involved (UN, NATO, WEU), unity of command will *never* be achieved. Unity of *purpose* however, can be achieved and disruptive incidents minimized as long as the mandate and accompanying military doctrine are mutually understood and agreed, and where that understanding and agreement are constantly revalidated if the mission is modified or changed («mission creep»).

- *Exercises*: Exercises focused on peace operations are clearly important activities for cooperation and not surprisingly have been highlighted in recent Ministerial Communiqués. Exercises build teamwork, solidarity and confidence, and most important, identify interoperability weaknesses requiring corrective action to ensure effective prosecution of a peace operation.

It should be remembered, however, that exercises are designed to validate training, and training is derived from the doctrine associated with a particular peace operation. The temptation to exploit political and public relations value from high visibility exercises should not outstrip the pick and shovel work involved in getting the doctrine and training right in the first place. Otherwise we put the cart before the horse and learn bad habits in the offing.

4. *Peace operation cooperation: with whom and how?* The previous section looked at some of the more important issues involved in peace operations which should form the substance of whatever cooperation may occur among the four security structures being addressed. This section looks at who is cooperating with whom and how is it being handled.

• *UN and CSCE:* As mentioned previously, CSCE is generally recognized as a regional organization as described in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Article 53 requires that «no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council...», and Article 54 requires regional organizations to keep the Security Council informed of all activities relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, cooperation between the UN and CSCE implies a requirement for close coordination at the outset. Also, in the area of crisis prevention, it is incumbent upon both organizations to cooperate closely in the provision of observers, fact-finders, monitors and other missions to avoid unnecessary duplication and expense. CSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAM) established in 1992 to monitor the implementation of UN-mandated sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are a case in point. A brief assessment of UN/CSCE cooperation would seem to indicate that it is *adequate at present*, but one must recognize that the CSCE is structurally weak and thus far is operating modestly at the low end of peace operations. The requirement for more active coordination and cooperation will dramatically increase, however, with more CSCE «institutionalization», CSCE movement toward «operationalizing» early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management and a UN desire to shed some of the peace operation burden down to regional organizations.

• *NATO and WEU*: NATO and WEU are entering a new plateau of cooperation and coordination stemming from the 1994 Brussels NATO Summit. The principle focus is on giving form and substance to the «separable but not separate» concept of NATO capabilities and resources being used to make ESDI a reality. The CJTF initiative is the instrument — a C<sup>2</sup> headquarters — which can be used by both NATO and the WEU, with NATO members not part of integrated military command and non-NATO participation, to provide either organization the capability to prosecute peace operations out-of-area. The NATO military authorities are currently working the issue in its military dimension; however, the political authorities of both NATO and the WEU have yet to fully engage at the political-military level to address the related command and control issues at the strategic level. Issues include: development of political guidance for CJTF C<sup>2</sup>; the creation of policy coordination and crisis management mechanisms at the strategic level which can provide advice to the WEU, coordinate with and perform the functions performed by the Military Committee, IS/IMS and related MNC in NATO's command structure; creation of a workable theater headquarters mechanism for the WEU at the operational level to provide the bridge between the strategic level (WEU) and the tactical level (CJTF); and ensuring that organizational and structural modifications designed for a CJTF do not erode the integrity of NATO's integrated military command. NATO and WEU, as mentioned earlier, are primarily peace-enforcement instruments, and at the operational and tactical levels valuable experience is currently being gained in *Operation Sharp Guard*, even though initial efforts in the Adriatic were more competitive than complementary. A brief assessment would indicate that cooperation, *thought not adequate at present, is improving*. This improvement is clearly helped by participation of NATO and WEU Secretary-Generals at each others' Ministerials; sharing products emanating from the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping; co-location in Brussels of the WEU Secretariat and NATO headquarters; and overlapping membership of both organizations as seen in NATO's NACC and WEU's Associate Partners. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that WEU's organizational structure is weak, and that its modest planning cell is unable to compete on equal terms with NATO's combination of IS, IMS and SHAPE/ACLANT. Also, there is a need for recipro-

city and transparency in terms of the WEU keeping NATO fully informed of WEU planning.

• *NATO and UN/CSCE:* I chose to combine the UN and CSCE in discussing NATO's relationship to both, only because either the UN or CSCE would more than likely be the authorizing organization of a peace operation, and NATO in either case would be the «subcontractor» or executing agent, particularly of any peace-enforcement mission. Because the CSCE is still trying to find its feet, comments relating to cooperation between NATO and UN/CSCE will in the main focus on the more mature relationship with the UN and the experience being developed from operations in and around the FRY. As I indicated at the outset, cooperation has improved and is *adequate* at the *operational and tactical levels* in the context of *Operation Deny Flight*, *Sharp Guard* and planning for NATO ground operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although lacking unity of command, unity of purpose is facilitated by parallel hierarchical structures with a design for horizontal liaison between the two. NATO currently has liaison offices in DPKO at UN Headquarters in New York (strategic level), UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb (operational level) and BHC at Sarajevo (tactical level), with UNPROFOR liaison at the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza. In essence, NATO's theater command (AFSOUTH) at the operational level is paralleled by UNPROFOR, and NATO's planned tactical level CJTF, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), is paralleled by BHC.

Where the *cooperation is weakest* is at the *strategic level* (Brussels and New York) and command and control arrangements between the operational and strategic level. Delays in executing NATO close air support missions for UNPROFOR forces were not due solely to a cumbersome command chain, but to basic conceptual disagreement at the strategic level on the use of military force. This conceptual issue has not been resolved — in short, the mixture of UN-directed «peacekeepers» and NATO «peace-enforcers» in the same tactical context and theater may not be conceptually or practically sound. Use of coercive military force by an organization inevitably makes that organization a co-belligerent in the eyes of other belligerents, and where certain nations provide units for both peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, the belligerent who is being bombed may lack the sophis-

tication to distinguish between the two. In any event, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement units are structured and equipped differently, so it is not surprising that French and UK lightly armed peacekeeping units in UNPROFOR view with some alarm the potential of being in close proximity to NATO peace-enforcement missions. Related issues include: the relationship between the NAC at 16 and the Security Council at 15; and with NATO in support of a UN-directed peace operation, SHAPE's relationship to the operational level (AFSOUTH/UNPROFOR) and the strategic level (Brussels/New York). Finally, although recognizing that the UN DPKO should be the focal point for peace operation doctrinal and training guidance, NATO needs to be more proactive in sharing with the UN NATO experience captured both from the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping and field operations in FRY. The UN needs all the help it can get from lessons learned relating to peace operation doctrine, training, interoperability and logistic support. That should be a key function of the NATO liaison office in New York. Much more needs to be done in this regard.

With regard to NATO's cooperation with the CSCE, it is virtually non-existent in spite of the rhetoric suggesting otherwise. There are political minefields to be sure. Some nations are suggesting treaty status for the CSCE which could result in a downgrading of NATO's political clout, and NATO may face potential competition with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as CSCE agent of choice for certain peace operation scenarios. Nonetheless, if the promise of «operationalizing» CSCE's capabilities for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management is in any way met, NATO's cooperation and coordination with CSCE will have to be dramatically improved.

5. *Summary:* An assessment of cooperation in peace operations among the UN, CSCE, NATO and the WEU yields a mixed review. There is both good news and bad news, and the overarching conclusion is that the current communiqué rhetoric is not matched by reality on the ground. General conclusions can be summarized as follows:

- Both the CSCE and the WEU are still weak in institutional structure;

hence the mechanisms (e.g., planning staffs) for meaningful cooperation are not well developed;

- In an operational and tactical context, NATO and the WEU are improving their cooperation, but much work remains to be accomplished at the strategic and political-military level with command and control arrangements. Work done by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping is valuable to spreading lessons learned between the NACC/PFP and WEU with its Associate Partners. NATO is weakest in its cooperation with the UN and CSCE with regard to command and control at the strategic level as well as establishing an agenda for rationalized UN guidance on doctrine, training, interoperability, logistic support and exercises applicable to UN, CSCE, NATO and WEU peace operations. In an operational context (operational and tactical levels) NATO's cooperation with the UN is adequate and improving, although more work needs to be done with the command and control linkage between the operational and strategic levels (AFSOUTH/UNPROFOR vs. Brussels/New York). Much more conceptual work is needed between Brussels and New York on the role of force in peace operations, and the compatibility of peace-enforcement with UN-directed peace operations, i.e., the mixing of «peacekeepers» and «peace-enforcers» in the same tactical context. A major effort needs to be launched by NATO with regard to cooperation with the CSCE, particularly when CSCE strategic warning, conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities become more operational;
- As NATO moves to increase its cooperation with the WEU and CSCE, it needs to be mindful of two potential Trojan Horses. First, as new procedures and structures are developed to support the CJTF concept and give substance to «separable but not separate» capabilities, care must be taken to protect the integrity and effectiveness of NATO's integrated military command (a unique asset) with all that implies in terms of interoperable doctrine, techniques and procedures. Second, as NATO contributes to «operationalizing» CSCE's capabilities in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, it should realize that it is imparting to CSCE just those

capabilities that make NATO unique. In its enthusiasm to cooperate, NATO must be careful lest it undermine its own institutional relevance. Cooperation in digging one's own grave is a dubious enterprise at best.

	CSCE	NACC	PFP	NATO	WEU
United States	x	x	x	x	
Canada	x	x	x	x	
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x
Spain	x	x	x	x	x
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x	x	r
Denmark	x	x	x	x	o
Iceland	x	x	x	x	a
Norway	x	x	x	x	a
Turkey	x	x	x	x	a
Austria	x	( <sup>1</sup> )			
Finland	x	o	x		
Ireland	x				o
Sweden	x	( <sup>1</sup> )	x		
Switzerland	x				
Albania	x	x	x		
Bulgaria	x	x	x		b
Czech Republic	x	x	x		b
Hungary	x	x	x		b
Poland	x	x	x		b
Slovakia	x	x	x		b
Romania	x	x	x		b
Estonia	x	x	x		b
Latvia	x	x	x		b
Lithuania	x	x	x		b
Russia	x	x	x		
Ukraine	x	x	x		

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	<i>CSCE</i>	<i>NACC</i>	<i>PFP</i>	<i>NATO</i>	<i>WEU</i>
Belarus	x	x			
Moldova	x	x	x		
Armenia	x	x			
Azerbaijan	x	x	x		
Georgia	x	x	x		
Kazakhstan	x	x	x		
Turkmenistan	x	x	x		
Uzbekistan	x	x	x		
Kyrgyzstan	x	x	x		
Tajikistan	x	x			
Bosnia & Hercegovina	x				
Croatia	x				
F.Y.R. of Macedonia	o				
Slovenia	x		x		
Yugoslavia	s				
Others <sup>(1)</sup>	x				
TOTALS (not including observers)	53	38	38	16	22

*Symbols*

x = member

a = associate member

b = associate partner

o = observer

r = ratification pending

s = suspended

<sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Sweden are not members of NACC, but, together with Finland which has observer status in NACC, participate in the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

<sup>(2)</sup> Other states include Cyprus, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino.

*John O. B. Sewall*